Tussles on the jurisdictional issue between sectoral regulators and the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) are not new. Courts settled the conflict between the sectoral regulator (Joint/State Electricity Regulatory Commission) and the CCI in various instances. However, the recent order passed by the CCI in the case of Torrent Power Limited (“TPL”) presents a unique dispute because of the specific provisions of the Electricity Act (“EA”), which tried to give the EA overriding power over the Competition Act (“CA”).
The EA empowers sectoral regulators to oversee tariff regulation, licensing, and dispute resolution. However, giving them the power to deal with the cases that are very specific to the CA dissolves the existence of the CA. The order in the TPL case has rightly established the CCI’s jurisdiction but failed to differentiate the role of the sectoral regulator and CCI correctly.
The article recommends perfectly harmonizing the jurisdiction conflict and providing a structured framework for regulatory coordination, ensuring both competitive markets and effective sectoral oversight.
The Fine Line Between Oversight and Overreach: Deciphering the Jurisdictional Rift
The dispute between the jurisdiction of two special acts, i.e., the CA and EA, is caused by specific provisions of the EA, which portray the legislation’s intention to supersede the CA.
Firstly, Section 60 of the EA gives the appropriate commission powers to provide directions to the licensee or generating company in three conditions: i) when an agreement results in an adverse effect on competition, ii) when there is an abuse of dominant position, or iii) when a combination is likely to hurt competition. These provisions closely resemble the regulatory framework established under the CA, which expressly prohibits anti-competitive agreements (Section 3), abuse of dominant position (Section 4), and anti-competitive combinations (ection ection 5). When the EA came into existence, CA was already in existence. This overlap of the provisions which provides jurisdictional power to their respective authorities has led to a jurisdictional ambiguity, raising concerns about potential regulatory conflicts and inconsistent enforcement in cases involving competition-related issues within the electricity sector. Therefore, the provision incorporated in Electricity Act appear to be in tension with those of the Competition Act.
Secondly, Section 173 of the EA states that if the provisions of the EA are contradictory to the three mentioned provision, then the contradictory provision should not have effect. This provision explicitly excludes the CA. Thirdly, Section 174 of the EA states that the EA should have an overriding effect over any other legislation, and the exception is the acts mentioned under Section 173 of the EA. A joint reading of Sections 173 and 174 portrays the legislative intent to confer exclusive authority over competition-related matters in the electricity sector to the sectoral regulator rather than the CCI.
The Legal Tug-of-War: How the CCI’s Torrent Order Reframes the Relationship Between Sectoral and Competition Law:
TPL acquired a 51% stake in Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu Power Distribution Corporation Limited. with the aim of improving distribution efficiency by privatization. A competitive bidding process was used to structure the privatization process. A government-backed Transfer Scheme made transferring their assets easier for the state-owned DNH Power Distribution Corporation Limited. This created a new power distribution company of which TPL controlled 51% and the government 49%.
The CCI began questioning the transaction and opened an investigation under Section 43A. The main contention was whether TPL had to notify the CCI before completing the transaction. When necessary, according to Section 6(2), the CCI may punish parties who complete transactions without providing previous notice under Section 43A.
After noting that the combined assets and turnover of TPL and the acquired firm surpassed the Act’s thresholds, the CCI took notice of the transaction, deeming it a notifiable “combination.” CCI’s main concerns were whether the EA’s regulatory framework might supersede competition duties and if the deal should have been pre-approved under merger control laws.
As a special law, the EA regulated all facets of the electricity industry, including competition issues, according to TPL’s defence. TPL also cited earlier decisions that supported the EA’s superiority over the Act, such as the Anand Prakash Order and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Essar Power Ltd. TPL referenced the Delhi High Court’s Second Ericsson Judgement, which held that sectoral laws—in that case, the Patents Act—should supersede the CCI’s authority. TPL further contended, citing  and ection 146, that the EA provided an independent framework for regulating mergers in the power industry.
CCI observed that the Act offered a much more thorough procedure for evaluating mergers, defining combinations, locating pertinent markets, and determining anti-competitive impacts. The EA was insufficient for such regulation since it lacked particular provisions for assessing how mergers might affect competition. The Act was a special statute that took precedence because it was created expressly to evaluate market competition in mergers. The EA did not have a comprehensive framework for regulating mergers.
Lack of Jurisdictional Clarity in Regulatory Conflicts: The Competition Act vs. The Electricity Act:
Through its order in the TPL case, the CCI marks a significant shift from the Anand Prakash Aggarwal v. Dakshin Haryana Bijlu Vitran Nigam order, where the Competition Appellate Tribunal favored the EA. The reasoning stated that the EA was an act that was established after the CA; therefore, it will supersede the CA. The court relied on the order of SC in the case of KSL & Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd.,(“KSL case”), where itwas held that if a subsequent act imposes a provision with a non-obstante clause even after they were aware of the previous act, then the subsequent act should supersede the previously established act. In this case, the court rightly criticized the analysis of the KSL case and held that an act just being the subsequent act does not give them the overriding power over the earlier statute. In this order, the court has rightly criticized the Anand Prakash Aggarwal judgment and overturned it by establishing the jurisdiction of the CCI.
However, the order has failed to prove that the provision of the EA is trying to override the CA, which is wrong. It has also failed to bolster the jurisdiction of the CCI in the dispute, particularly given that the provisions in question are primarily governed by the CCI through the comprehensive merger control framework under Sections 5 and 6 of the CA, which lays down detailed thresholds, notification requirements, and timelines to regulate combinations that may have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. This position was rightly established in the case of Neeraj Malhotra v. North Delhi Power Ltd. & Ors. (“Neeraj Malhotra case”). In contrast to Anand Prakash, where the tribunal relied primarily on chronology and a non-obstante clause to elevate the EA over the CA, the Neeraj Malhotra judgment adopts a harmonised approach, distinguishing the jurisdiction of sectoral regulators for technical matters and the CCI for competition-related issues. Therefore, this overlap of the provisions that provide jurisdictional power to their respective authorities has led to a jurisdictional ambiguity, raising concerns about potential regulatory conflicts and inconsistent enforcement in cases involving competition-related issues within the electricity sector. In the TPL case, the CCI should have adhered to the structured approach in the Neeraj Malhotra case, ensuring a clear division of regulatory responsibilities. CCI is best suited to handle such disputes rather than deferring to sectoral regulators under the EA, and the sectoral regulation should handle the matter, which is technical and specific to the sector. This harmonious distribution of responsibility will put an end to the jurisdictional tussle.
Balancing Competition Law and Sectoral Regulation: A Cross Jurisdictional Analysis:
The TPL case is a perfect example of regulatory confusion resulting from the jurisdictional overlap between the CCI and sectoral regulators. Following international best practices from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) and other jurisdictions, a balanced regulatory framework guarantees legislative clarity.
Countries like Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil have effectively managed these conflicts by implementing explicit legal frameworks that create exclusive sectoral jurisdiction for technical matters while guaranteeing that competition authorities maintain control over market structure and anti-competitive behavior, according to the OECD’s 2022 Report.
Firstly, India can implement a structured regulatory regime by changing the EA to establish distinct jurisdictional boundaries between sectoral regulators and the CCI, which is easier said than done. To maintain the technical and financial stability of the power industry, the CERC should continue to have sole authority over licensing, tariff regulation, and market structuring. However, as cartelisation, abuse of power, and mergers have wider market ramifications than sector-specific laws, CCI should get involved in these cases. A formal consultation process between CCI and CERC should be required to avoid contradicting decisions. This strategy ensures regulatory coherence and is modeled after international best practices, such as Belgium’s partnership between CREG and the Competition Authority.
Secondly, a tiered strategy guarantees the respect of both market-wide competition enforcement and specialized expertise. In the landmark Bharti Airtel v. CCI ruling, TRAI settled technical disputes, but CCI could still look into anti-competitive behavior. A dual-track system has been adopted by nations like Brazil and Mexico, where sectoral regulators can submit issues to competition authorities for final decision-making. The respective regulators  in Mexico’s energy industry but cooperate to settle conflicts effectively. This strategy guarantees predictable legal results and discourages forum shopping.
Lastly, the report suggests establishing formal coordination mechanisms to guarantee smooth regulatory enforcement. Many nations have formalized agreements (“MoUs”) between competition authorities and regulators to lessen conflict. India can define the scope of the CCI jurisdiction, clarify how competition laws apply to electricity regulation, and create a clear framework for merger reviews and investigations into anti-competitive behaviour by implementing Sector-Specific Competition Guidelines modelled after the EU. All These measures will streamline regulatory oversight and create a structured approach to balancing competition enforcement with sectoral regulation.
Conclusion
The order in the TPL case marks a turning point in defining the legal limits separating sectoral regulation and competition law. The provisions of the EA continue to produce ambiguity, which results in regulatory conflicts, even though the CCI has correctly maintained its jurisdiction in evaluating mergers and anti-competitive behaviour. Maintaining regulatory clarity will be essential as India’s economy develops to avoid legal ambiguities that can discourage investment and market efficiency. Will jurisdictional conflicts continue to influence the regulatory environment, or will the CCI and sectoral regulators be able to work together to find a mutually beneficial solution? The response will dictate how competition law develops in India’s changing market structure.
This blog is written by Arjun Kapur and Om Chandak, 5th Year student and 4th Year Student respectively, National Law University, Mumbai.
