Introduction
An independent judiciary is indispensable, but it must also be accountable to the Constitution and the people. This principle has been put to the test yet again following a fire at the official residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, the second seniormost judge of the Delhi High Court (“HC”), which led to the alleged discovery of partially burnt sacks of cash.
In a recent development, the Supreme Court (“SC”) constituted an in-house inquiry into the matter. Following the findings, the then Chief Justice of India (“CJI”) Sanjiv Khanna advised Justice Varma to resign voluntarily. However, Justice Varma took an unexpected stand by refusing to resign, diverging from the pattern of previous judges who had exited quietly under pressure. His refusal has now forced the matter into the constitutional domain.
This episode renews focus on judicial accountability, transparency, and the credibility of misconduct mechanisms in India, a country where no judge has ever been impeached despite serious charges. Through the Justice Yashwant Varma case, this article examines the impeachment framework, past attempts, systemic flaws, and the balance between accountability and independence.
The Legal Conundrum of Impeachment in India
I. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
The removal of judges is governed by Articles 124(4) and 124(5) of the Constitution for Supreme Court judges and Articles 217 and 218 for HC judges. Judges may be removed only on the grounds of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” through a presidential order following the adoption of a motion by both Houses of the Parliament with a special majority. Although the Constitution does not use the term “impeachment,” it has become the accepted parlance.
As per Article 124(5), Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, and the accompanying Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969, detailing the procedure for judicial removal. A motion requires support from at least 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members and must be admitted by the Speaker or Chairman. Once admitted, a three-member committee comprising a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist investigates the allegations. If the charges are upheld, both Houses must pass the motion by a majority of the total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting. Following approval, the President may order the judge’s removal.
II. Precedents and Past Attempts
Despite the procedural architecture, impeachment has been proven largely ineffective. In independent India, only five proceedings have been initiated, with no judge ever being removed through this route. The first, involving Justice V. Ramaswami in 1993, failed despite adverse findings. Justice Soumitra Sen resigned in 2011 after the Rajya Sabha passed an impeachment motion. Cases against Justices Pardiwala, Gangele, and Nagarjuna Reddy were stalled either due to insufficient evidence or a lack political will. Justice Dinakaran resigned before the proceedings began, while a motion against the then CJI Dipak Misra was dismissed outright.
III. In-House Inquiry Procedure
In 1999, drawing on C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the Supreme Court instituted an in-house procedure to discreetly address judicial misconduct. It authorises the CJI to initiate a preliminary inquiry and, if necessary, appoint a committee of senior judges for a formal investigation. Where minor lapses are found, the judge may be advised to resign or retire; in more serious cases, the matter is forwarded to the President and Prime Minister, potentially triggering impeachment.
IV. Judicial Accountability and Criminal Liability: The Veeraswami Ruling
The question of whether a sitting judge can face criminal prosecution was addressed in the landmark case of K. Veeraswami v. Union of India in 1991. The SC held that while a judge can be considered a public servant, sanction to prosecute must come from the CJI. This ruling came two months after the impeachment motion against Justice V. Ramaswami had been initiated.
It is also worth noting that in 2019, for the first time, the then CJI, Ranjan Gogoi, allowed the CBI to file an FIR against Justice S. N. Shukla, while his predecessor CJI, Dipak Misra had recommended impeachment proceedings, but the government did not act upon it.
Structural Impunity: Loopholes In Judicial Accountability In India
Judicial accountability in India rests on a fragile foundation, weakened by procedural opacity, institutional insularity, and political complicity. This has fostered a culture of impunity within the higher judiciary, eroding public trust and the rule of law. Though tasked with upholding constitutional morality, the judiciary is constrained by mechanisms that are themselves structurally flawed and legally ambiguous.
A central pillar of this crisis lies in the opaque and informal collegium system that governs judicial appointments. Bereft of codified criteria for selection based on merit, integrity, or experience, the collegium operates in secrecy, resisting any form of public scrutiny or institutional oversight. This lack of transparency enables arbitrariness and fosters perceptions of favouritism, while the government’s ability to delay or veto names, without providing any explanation, further injects executive influence into the process.
This lack of transparency extends to judicial transfers, which, though permitted under Article 222, are often carried out without the judge’s consent. Framed as serving the “better administration of justice”, these transfers frequently appear arbitrary and opaque, functioning in practice as covert instruments of punishment or control, deployed to silence inconvenient voices or distance judges perceived as dissenting from prevailing political or judicial narratives. Without clear criteria or accountability, it is difficult to tell if a transfer is truly administrative or merely retaliatory.
Equally problematic is the “in-house procedure”; this mechanism also operates in complete opacity. Its internal, confidential, and informal nature shields errant judges from genuine scrutiny, creating an institutional culture where silence is preferred over transparency and where erring judges can be quietly protected from public exposure or legal consequences. In 2008, a committee formed by the then CJI K.G. Balakrishnan found Justice Nirmal Yadav’s misconduct in the “cash-at-door” scandal serious enough to warrant removal, yet she was exonerated. It was only in 2011 that the CBI secured permission to prosecute, culminating in her acquittal in 2025 due to the lack of evidence. Critics argue that this mechanism serves to protect judges rather than uphold accountability, with Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar asserting that it “lacks constitutional basis or legal sanctity”.
Perhaps the most glaring flaw in the current accountability framework is the ability of judges to resign mid-proceedings, thereby effectively aborting any investigation or punitive action. This precedent, seen in the cases of Justices P.D. Dinakaran and Soumitra Sen, has enabled judges to evade scrutiny while retaining post-retirement benefits. RTI disclosures showed Dinakaran’s inquiry committee sought to proceed despite his resignation but was blocked. Such gaps severely weaken accountability by enabling judges to evade justice through voluntary exit.
Political Shadows on the Bench
At the highest tier of judicial accountability lies impeachment, a grave constitutional remedy for proven misconduct. Yet, in practice, it remains largely symbolic. In 75 years, no judge has been successfully impeached, largely due to the political consensus required: a two-thirds majority in both the Houses of Parliament. This threshold invites partisan interference, as seen in the case of Justice V. Ramaswami, who remained in office despite being found guilty by an inquiry committee, after the ruling party abstained from voting. His case starkly illustrates how political expediency can thwart judicial accountability.
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
Compounding these concerns is the entanglement of political influence with judicial aspirations. The prospect of post-retirement appointments to commissions and tribunals, often at the discretion of the executive, creates subtle yet undeniable incentives for sitting judges to remain in the government’s good graces. The absence of a mandatory cooling-off period between demitting office and assuming such roles undermines the perception of impartiality, making judicial independence vulnerable to political patronage and executive largesse.
Judicial independence and judicial accountability are not opposing forces but complementary pillars of a healthy democracy. Unlike many liberal democracies that rely on independent councils for judicial discipline, India places this power solely in the Parliament, making accountability highly political and often ineffective. Countries like the UK, the US, and Canada use structured, depoliticised systems that balance independence with public oversight, while India’s framework remains prone to political influence and lacks effective enforcement.
Conclusion
The Justice Yashwant Varma episode once again brings to light the deep-rooted structural infirmities in the system. While independence is essential for the judiciary to function as a constitutional sentinel, it cannot come at the cost of accountability. The absence of clear statutory norms on judicial conduct and the ambiguity surrounding “proved misbehaviour” leave disciplinary processes reactive, inconsistent, and open to selective application.
To restore institutional integrity, reforms must be substantive. Codifying the in-house mechanism into a transparent, time-bound legal process is imperative. Establishing an independent Judicial Complaints Commission, comprising retired judges, jurists, and civil society members, could ensure impartial investigations.
The system also requires transparent appointment procedures, enforceable judicial codes of conduct, and statutory safeguards that facilitate public oversight. A mandatory cooling-off period for post-retirement roles would curb executive influence, while a greater collegium transparency would strengthen legitimacy. Finally, the impeachment process must be restructured to avoid political deadlock without diluting due process. These institutional reforms are essential to uphold both judicial independence and democratic accountability.
This blog is written by Ishita Rajput, 2nd Year student, NLIU, Bhopal.
