Keywords: Asylum Procedure Regulation, Safe Third Country, European Commission, Relocation, Principle of Non-Refoulment, Principle of Mutual Trust, Deportation.
Introduction
A young Afghan journalist, denied protection at an EU border, is rerouted to a ‘safe third country’ she has never stepped foot in. Her appeal is pending, but she is told that she cannot stay in Europe while it has to be decided yet. This is not fiction. It may soon be European law.
This concern arises from the amendments proposed by the European Commission in May 2025. Under the Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR), the Commission is required to review the safe third country (STC) concept and, where necessary, propose amendments.
Among the Commission’s proposed amendments, two major shifts stand out for their structural impact. First, under the STC rule (Article 59 of APR), removing the requirement that a country, who is accepting the asylum-seeker, should have a connection with the asylum seeker in order to receive them; second, the withdrawal of the automatic suspensive effect of an appeal, meaning rejected asylum applicants might be deported before their appeal is heard.
At first glance, these changes might appear to give asylum seekers access to more options; however removing the personal-connection requirement undermines a personalised risk assessment. Under the proposed changes, a member state can declare an application inadmissible and send them to another country, relying solely on a state-to-state agreement.
On the face of it, these changes are justified by ease of administrative processes and migration facilitation. However, these amendments show a turn in the EU’s approach in tackling the issue of migration. This article argues that the reforms do not simply pose a threat to human rights; they form a system where legal rights are nominal and inaccessible in practice.
The First Amendment: The “Safe Third Country” without connection
The safe third country concept, under Article 59 of APR, along with Recital 46 of APR provides that, for an asylum seeker to be transferred to a third country, the personal connection of the individual is taken into consideration, which ensures that the transfer is non-arbitrary.
The Commission’s proposed amendments revise this existing requirement. The proposed amendments under the Article 59(5)(b)(iii) of the APR, permit transfer even without a personal connection. Instead, a member state can declare an asylum application inadmissible and transfer the asylum-seeker to any third country listed as safe by the EU, even in the absence of any personal ties and may transfer the applicant based on an “inter-governmental agreement.”
An STC is presumed to have adequate protection and must not pose a threat to life, liberty or serious harm. However, the criteria for determining safety are often politically negotiated and vary significantly in application. This is problematic because it leads to situations where countries with questionable human rights records are designated as “safe.”
A striking example of this danger emerged in Italy’s offshoring of asylum seekers, as per their arrangement with Albania. Under this Agreement, asylum seekers from states such as Bangladesh and Egypt were relocated to facilities in Albania, despite having no prior link to that country and with limited avenues to challenge their transfer. The arrangement shows how, without individual circumstances, the STC rule becomes a dangerous tool rather than a safeguard. It mirrors dangers in the Commission’s reform and strips asylum of its substantive protection. Additionally the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2025 has taken cognizance of this issue and has held that asylum obligations cannot be outsourced through intergovernmental agreements that bypass EU protections.
The Second Amendment: Withdrawal of Automatic Suspensive Effect of Appeal
Currently, EU law ensures that asylum seekers are not removed while their appeal is still pending, particularly where there is a risk of violating the principle of non-refoulement. Even when an asylum application is declared inadmissible, under the STC rule under Article 38(1)(a) of APR, existing EU law generally prevents the applicant’s removal while an appeal is pending. The applicant’s appeal generally suspends their deportation until the appeal is decided.
Under Article 68(3)(b) of the proposed amendments, appeals against the inadmissibility of an asylum seeker, including those made under Article 38(1)(a), would no longer suspend deportation automatically. Instead, an applicant must file a separate request to stop the removal. Unless the request is made and approved in time, a person can be expelled before the court even reviews whether the transfer was lawful.
Together, these amendments represent a significant shift in the EU’s Asylum management, under which procedural efficiency may take precedence over individual rights. In recent years, governments have been trying to avoid their responsibilities in many ways. Among the several ways, the most prominent one has been to send asylum seekers to another country. While framed as improving administrative efficiency, the effect may be weakening the fundamental rights of people.
Beyond Procedure: Human Rights Risks and Legal Exclusion
The amendments have far-reaching impacts on the fundamental human rights of individuals, as they endanger the principle of non-refoulement, protected under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention. Under Article 66 of the APR, people whose asylum claims are inadmissible—for example, because of the STC rule under Article 38(1)(a), the asylum seeker no longer has an automatic right to stay during the appeal. This change creates a risk of refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU. Since, deportations can happen even before any judge reviews whether their country is actually safe for them. Therefore, in practice, the burden is shifted from the member state to the asylum-seeker to separately appeal for the halt of deportation.
As per the proposed amendments, it would replace the individual link with a state-to-state guarantee, creating a presumption that the third country is safe, based on these diplomatic guarantees and not on personal facts or experience. ECtHR has emphasised that presumed safety cannot override the obligation to assess the real risk. Yet, under the proposed changes, the applicant must now request suspensive effect separately, which is an additional burden on the asylum seeker.
The procedural shortcut created by lifting the automatic suspensive effect, especially in inadmissibility decisions based on safe third country designation, opens the door to mass deportations. When personal connections are no longer a requirement, authorities would be empowered to process and expel large groups of applicants under the same reasoning, often without any individual assessment. In this light, reforms do not merely affect efficiency, but challenge the very essence of asylum as a right, grounded in procedural fairness and non-discrimination.
By bypassing these requirements, the reforms erode the principle of mutual trust that plays a major role in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). They also risk shifting the burden to states in externalising the responsibility without EU oversight. By eliminating protections like the personal connection requirement, the reforms assume that third countries will uphold EU-level protections without actually proving it. As evidenced by labelling Libyaas a safe country, which was further scrutinised by UNHCR. When asylum is outsourced to non-EU countries through agreements, those states are not bound by EU law or courts, hence the EU loses direct oversight. Further, the designation of countries such as Bangladesh, Kosovo and Tunisia, as ‘safe countries of origin’ by EU also illustrates this trend. Notably, Bangladesh was included despite persistent concerns over human rights violations.
Similarly, Italy’s 2023 deal with Albania to offshore asylum processing illustrates the risk of externalising protection without EU oversight. The agreement bypassed CEAS protections and relied on a non-EU country’s weaker standards. The deal allowed Italy to transfer asylum seekers intercepted at sea to Albanian facilities, despite Albania not being bound to EU laws. However, in 2024, this was suspended by Albania’s Constitutional Court in decision (V-2/24), the judges also highlighted the dangers of shifting asylum duties without enforceable guarantees.
Lastly, removing automatic protection would disproportionately affect the most vulnerable. As many asylum seekers lack legal representation, resources to halt removals in time. Since, a remedy that cannot be accessed before the harm occurs is not effective, the proposed amendments create an inherent disadvantage to the underrepresented part of the society, who are less likely to navigate through complex and expensive procedures.
In toto, these reforms move beyond the spectrum of a procedural adjustment. They risk establishing a system where rights are guaranteed, but rendered practically inaccessible to those they are meant to protect. If approved, these amendments would mean a shift in the way an individual seeks asylum in the EU.
The Way Forward
The proposed reforms to the EU’s asylum system risk transforming protection from a genuine right into a hollow formality. By allowing transfers to a ‘safe third country’ without any personal connection and permitting deportations before appeals are decided, the amendments replace individualised risk assessments with political agreements and administrative convenience. A plethora of examples, including Italy’s 2025, show the dangers of this policy. This approach outsources asylum processing and the designation of countries with poor human rights records as “safe” showing how easily fundamental safeguards are undermined. This policy strips away these protections, which in effect not only endangers vulnerable people but also erodes the principle of fairness, accountability and mutual trust. Therefore, a truly effective asylum system must ensure that every individual’s claim is assessed fairly, with real remedies available, so that asylum remains a substantive safeguard rather than an empty promise.
Lastly, the amendments risk hollowing out the EU’s asylum system by prioritising efficiency over human rights. Legal protection cannot remain effective if procedure like individual assessment is eroded. Moving forward, the EU must reaffirm its human rights commitment by embedding non-refoulement protections into every stage of asylum processing. This includes automatic suspensive effect of appeals and ensuring accessible legal remedies for all. By, shifting protection from an individual right, the EU is risking undercutting its own legal coherence. How will courts meaningfully review asylum decisions if core protections are stripped away? it is a dangerous policy ideato curate “return hubs” in third countries.
A true effective asylum system is not one that moves faster but the one that protects better.
This blog is written by Akshat Gaur, 2nd year Student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University.
