This research paper seeks to thoroughly analyse an accused person’s right to default bail conferred by Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”). The paper examines the remarkable importance of this right to ensure the indispensable rights of an accused person, one of them being the ‘right to life and liberty’. Further on, the paper seeks to analyse two contentious areas under this theme. Firstly, the paper scrutinises the interpretation of the phrase ‘availed of’ with regard to the computation of the statutory period of custody, only after which the right to default bail becomes activated. Secondly, the paper investigates the method of cancellation of the right to default bail. Additionally, the paper has also undertaken an evaluation of the interaction between the default bail provision under Section 167 and special legislations, especially the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter, “UAPA”). The paper examines the hurdles faced in claiming default bail upon an arrest under UAPA. The paper notes the inability of criminal justice system to efficiently comply with the provisions at hand and to avail the accused of his right to default bail. This non-compliance contributes to severe violations of the crucial rights of the arrestees. The paper makes the remark that major constraints to the exercise of default bail stem from ambiguities. Given the immense and instrumental role of default bail in securing an accused person’s liberty, the paper submits that it is imperative to make appropriate amendments to the current laws so as to make the law less stringent and compliance more efficacious. Lastly, the paper attempts to offer certain suggestions that can help in structuring the way forward.
