Pallavi Arora talks about the ineffectiveness of the traditional defences of India that led to many hostile takeovers by the foreign nations in India.

Abstract

The central premise of this paper is to assess the theoretical
possibility of conducting hostile acquisitions in India, as
well as the defences exercisable by the domestic targets to
forestall such deals. To further this premise, the paper
comprehensively analyses the extant hurdles to hostile
takeover activity in India, arising due to dominant promoter
holdings, regulatory restrictions imposed on the acquisition
of finance and foreign direct investment in India.
Thereafter, the author examines the anti-acquirer character
of the Takeover Code, 2011, that inhibits a potential raider
from effectuating a hostile takeover. Finally, the paper
discusses the ineffectiveness of the traditional takeover
defences in India, which leaves target companies with few
viable strategies to fend off hostile suitors.